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CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
tion was no longer outstanding, since it had been previously transferred
by the plaintiff and cancelled. Pursuant to the applicable statute, damages
were awarded the defendants at their suggestion.2" The reviewing tribunal
reversed and remanded the award of damages since it was excessive, but
did not preclude the defendants from recovery.
In the principal case, the defendant neglected to raise an objection
to the issuance of the preliminary injunction notwithstanding the plain-
tiff's failure to post the bond required by statute. It seems unlikely that
the defendant's failure to interpose resistance was due to a mistake or
the like, since the defendant's attorney stated, by affidavit, that on the
day prior to the issuance of the injunction he had researched the appli-
cable statute and precedents. It seems probable that, had the defendant
called the attention of the court to the statutory requirement, the injunc-
tion would not have issued wrongfully and hence no damage would have
ensued.
21
By holding that one is not entitled to recover damages where he fails
to seasonably object to the issuance of an injunction the court had adhered
to the policy of equity which precludes parties from recovering damages
caused by their own errors and omissions. Even though the court is
presumed to know and take judicial notice of the laws of the forum, it
still remains incumbent upon the litigant to inform the tribunal of the
applicable statutory requirements so as to prevent the entry of erroneous
orders. To permit parties, who fail to interpose resistance, to recover
damages would, in effect, open the door to temptation, since unscrupulous
litigants could intentionally remain mute in the hope that an injunction
would issue wrongfully and then seek redress by way of damages.
M. F. HAUSELMAN
INTERNAL REVENuE-DEDUCTIONS AND CREDITS-WHETHIR PAYMENTS
MADE ON A NOMINAL LOAN FROM AN INSURER, WHERE LOAN PROCEEDS WERE
USED TO ACQUIRE BENEFITS OF ANNUITY CONTRACT WITH INSURER, ARE
PROPER DEDUCTIONS FOR FEDERAL INCOME TAX PURPOSES-A question of
general interest to members of the legal profession, those engaged in tax
work, and indeed, many taxpayers, was raised in the recent case of Knetsch
v. United States.' The plaintiffs there concerned had purchased certain
20 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 2, Ch. 69, § 12.
21 The issuance of an injunction to restrain the enforcement of a judgment is
wrongful when the statutory bond is not posted, Grossman v. Davis, 117 Ill. App.
354 (1904) ; Packer v. Roberts, 44 Ill. App. 232 (1892).
1 272 F. (2d) 200 (1959), affirming 58-2 U. S. T. C. 69, 739; certiorari granted,
361 U. S. 958.
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annuity savings bonds from an insurance company,2 for which they gave
a small cash payment and executed ten notes in a substantial amount for
the balance of the stated premiums. The notes called for annual interest
at 3 % but were lacking in any element of personal liability and were
secured only by the annuity contract bonds so issued.3 In succeeding
years the plaintiffs made further payments on the notes, received corre-
sponding credits against the purchase price of the bonds, re-borrowed the
amounts so paid under the new notes, paid interest thereon at the stated
rate, and claimed a deduction for this interest in each of the correspond-
ing taxable years. 4 Upon disallowance of these deductions, the tax de-
ficiencies were paid under protest and suit was brought in an appropriate
federal court for refund thereof. Relief was denied by the district court
where it was found that the annuity bonds so purchased afforded plain-
tiffs neither profit nor insurance; that the only possible benefit from the
transactions was in the form of a contemplated tax saving because of the
interest so charged ;5 and that the alleged interest was not interest in fact
but was merely the purchase price of a tax deduction. 6 On appeal by the
taxpayers this judgment was affirmed by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit.
2 The purchase was made in 1953, prior to the March 1, 1954, Internal Revenue
Code revisions. Int. Rev. Code Sec. 264(a). Disallowance of the deduction as to
annuity contracts applied only to those purchased after March 1, 1954. Section 264
further provides that "no deduction shall be allowed for any amount paid or ac-
crued on indebtedness incurred or continued to purchase or carry a single premium
life insurance, endowment, or annuity contract . . . A contract shall be treated
as a single premium contract (1) if substantially all the premiums on the con-
tract are paid within a period of 4 years from the date on which the contract is
purchased, or (2) if an amount is deposited after March 1, 1954 with the insurer
for payment of a substantial number of future premiums on the contract." Ex-
actly what constitutes a substantial number has not been litigated, but this pro-
vision has resulted in the discontinuance of advance premium deposits as an in-
tegral part of any current loan plan. While single premium loan contracts, as in
the case of Knetsch v. United States, are no longer permissible, current loan plans
could be affected by this decision.
8 Interest payable on the annuity bond was set at 2J% per annum, with the net
result that the insurer made, as its sale profit, the sum of 1% per year.
4 Interest paid on indebtedness is an allowable deduction under Int. Rev. Code
Sec. 163 (a).
5 If a policyholder in the 50% tax bracket borrows money at 4% interest and his
rate of return on the policy is 2 %, he has a favorable margin of J% after taking
the deduction (2j%-(50% X 4%) = J%). It does not follow that outright profit
will be realized from these transactions since only part of each premium is diverted
to the interest-earning cash surrender value of the policy; the balance is used to
pay insurance coverage and administrative costs. However, the interest deduction
does result in reduced insurance costs for the policyholder. Participation in these
plans is rarely recommended to the taxpayer below the 40% bracket since the
saving produced by the deduction in lower brackets will not exceed the differential
between interest paid and received.
6 The court likened the so called "interest charge" to an annual premium on
insurance, a form of purchase price on a deferred payment plan.
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Utilizing loan-financed life insurance and annuity plans as a means
of securing an interest deduction has long been a popular device for en-
joying federal income tax savings. From the single loan transactions that
prevailed prior to the enactment of section 264 of the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code 7-more commonly known as bank loan plans--have evolved
the currently popular annual loan-or minimum deposit-plans; these are
largely financed by the companies themselves and offer high life insurance
coverage at reduced rates through the use of the interest deduction. These
plans may be maintained by either bank or insurance-company loan, but
in either case, the cash surrender value of the policy serves as collateral
for the loan. Originally bank loans had been the preferred method of
financing these transactions. However, as a result of higher bank loan
interest rates,9 increasing competition from insurance companies, and a
general inflationary damper on insurance as an attractive long-term in-
vestment, the years since 1956 have witnessed a marked increase in the
number of insurance companies which have introduced minimum deposit
plans; these offer high initial cash surrender values,10 which, in turn, per-
mit the policyholder to pay a much larger portion of the first premiums by
policy loan and thus provides high insurance coverage for a low cash out-
lay. These plans are offered in addition to the ordinary policy loan plans
which require cash payment of a large part of the early premiums. On
the other hand, by using the annual increase in policy cash surrender
value as collateral, the policyholder under a minimum deposit plan can
continue partial payment of premiums by policy loan and at the same time
can utilize his capital for more attractive investments than insurance.
Despite the fact that the net death benefit decreases as the loan increases,
that any appreciation of premium investment is taxable if the policy is
surrendered, and that essentially all the investment aspect of a policy is
consumed by continuing loans, the minimum deposit plan is currently
very popular with high-bracket taxpayers.
The use of this tax-saving device has not been un-noticed or un-
challenged by the Treasury. It has consistently opposed a deduction for
7 See note 2, ante.
8 Since the 1954 Code prohibits plans whereby one bank loan in an amount equal
to the total discounted costs of premiums is deposited with the insurance company,
the term "bank loan plan" is now generally used to describe any current annual
payment premium financing plan where bank loans are used.
9 In response to the increase in interest rate by the Federal Reserve System bank
loan interest rates rose in 1956 to their highest level since 1934. Encyclopedia
Americana, Banks and Banking, at 79 (1957 Annual). This created an unprece-
dented demand for loans on insurance policies since nearly all insurance companies
provide for a 5% loan rate.
10 Minimum deposit plans extend over a longer period the costs that are usually
paid within the first 2 years under an ordinary loan plan, thereby reducing the
required amount of cash outlay.
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any interest paid under these plans and has long sought complete dis-
allowance by Congress, arguing that the deduction creates a tax loophole
since interest earned by the policy is tax-free. In 1942 Congress dis-
allowed any deduction for interest paid on loans to finance single premium
insurance and endowment contract. 1 In 1954 interest deductions were
disallowed on single premium annuity contracts, 12 and the definition of
single premium contract was broadened.'3 The Treasury's dissatisfaction
with these restrictions is evidenced by a list of unintended benefits and
hardships submitted to the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Inter-
nal Revenue Taxation in November, 1956.14 At hearings held by the sub-
committee " the recommendation was made that a deduction be disallowed
whenever a policy was obtained under a plan which contemplated paying
a substantial number of premiums by means of indebtedness. Repre-
sentatives of the insurance industry testified both for and against further
statutory disallowance.' 6 Both factions, however, united against policy-
holder intent as an objective means of determining disallowance, and ex-
pressed concern that it would prohibit the use of credit by those needing
insurance protection. This proposal was rejected by the Ways and Means
Committee in July, 1957. After hearings before the Senate Finance
Committee in February, 1958,1 with all segments of the insurance industry
11 Int. Rev. Code, Sec. 24(a)(6).
12 See note 2, ante.
13 See note 2, ante.
14 Staffs of the Joint Comm. on Internal Revenue Taxation, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.,
and the Treasury Dept., List of Substantive Unintended Benefits and Hardships
and Additional Problems for the Technical Amendments Bill of 1957, at 10, item
21 (1956).
15 Hearings on Technical Amendments to the Internal Revenue Code before the
Subcommittee on Internal Revenue Taxation of the House Committee on Ways and
Means, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 95, 168, 325 (1956).
16 Proponents of the plan argue that it provides high insurance coverage at lower
rates at an age when the policyholder needs high protection and yet prefers to use
capital for other investment purposes. Several companies have countered the
criticism that the net death benefit decreases as total indebtedness increases by
incorporating level term insurance provisions in the plans to stabilize coverage.
Opponents of the plan contend that it is frequently sold to persons who are not in
a sufficiently high tax bracket to justify the investment, and that clients are not
always made aware that it is the tax deduction of interest that makes these plans
economically feasible. The minimum deposit plan is also attacked as being dan-
gerous to the insurance company since the satisfaction of costs is extended over a
longer period. If many policies lapse during their early years, which they may if
policyholders lose interest as the interest payments increase and death benefits
decrease, and since the loans are made without personal liability, the insurance
companies could well suffer considerable losses. Minimum deposit and bank loan
plans are further evaluated in Van Cleve, The Bank Loan Plan: One Point of
View, 10 J. Am. Soc'y C. L. U. 167 (1956) ; National Underwriter (Life Insurance),
Jan. 3, 1959, pp. 1, 2, 12; Allowance of Interest Deduction Under Loan-Financed
Insurance Plans, Monthly Digest of Tax Articles, Vol. 10, No. 6 (March 1960), as
condensed from 47 Cal. L. R. 3 (1959), pp. 602-606.
17 Hearings on H. R. 8381 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess., 35, 43, 95, 393 (1958).
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opposing it, the proposal was again rejected, apparently due to the lack
of satisfactory criteria for enforcement. At present no further legislative
action concerning the proposal is pending.
Reflecting the restrictions imposed by Congress, and in light of the
Supreme Court's narrow definition of "interest",' the courts have also
questioned the deductibility of these payments. Litigation has been con-
fined to single premium annuity transactions in which the policyholder
had borrowed from the insurance company to pay the single premium,
having given a note without recourse, 19 the interest payments on the loan
being the only actual disbursements. These transactions were attacked
by the Commission in a 1954 Revenue Ruling,20 which claimed that the
deductions should be disallowed on two grounds: (1) the transactions
were sham in that their only purpose was to create an interest deduction ;21
and (2) there was no real indebtedness since no use of borrowed funds
was provided,22 the "interest" payments in reality representing the prem-
Is The Supreme Court has defined the term interest as used in the Internal Rev-
enue Code on several occasions. In Old Colony Railroad Co. v. Commissioner ofInternal Revenue, 284 U. S. 552, (1932), 76 L. Ed. 484, 489, it was held to be "the
amount which one has contracted to pay for the use of borrowed money." Here
the court rejected the Idea that Congress meant "effective interest" with the theory
of accounting or that "Congress used the word having in mind any other concept
other than the usual, ordinary, and everyday meaning of the term." Again, in
Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U. S. 488, (1940), 60 S. Ct. 363, the court stated that
. . . although an indebtedness is an obligation, an obligation Is not necessarily
an indebtedness within the meaning of sec. 23(b). Nor are all carrying charges
Interest. . . . We are dealing with the context of a revenue act and words whichhave today a well-known meaning. In the business world interest on indebtedness
means compensation for the use or forebearance of money. In absence of cleax
evidence to the contrary, we assume that Congress has used these words in that
sense."
19 The fact that the note is without recourse Is of no import in determining
whether there is real indebtedness. W. Stuart Emmons, 31 T. C. 26 (1958),
affirmed 270 F. (2d) 294 (1959) noted that nonrecourse is typical of Insurance
company loans to policyholders and that companies normally do not lend more
than the cash value of the policy, such cash value serving as collateral. The court
recognized that interest paid by cash basis taxpayers on policy loans Is deductible
regardless of personal liability.
20 Regulations 118, section 39.23(b); Rev. Rul. 54-94, 1954-I Cum. Bull. 53.
When their attention became focused on the so-called "tax saving" plans, the
Internal Revenue Service made the following ruling: "Amounts claimed as 'in-
terest' in connection with so-called tax savings plans the purpose of which is to
obtain an interest deduction for Federal income tax purposes are not deductible
under section 23(b) of the Internal Revenue Code."
21 The basis of this decision by the Commissioner was apparently Gregory v.
Helvering, 293 U. S. 465 (1935) which involved the creation of a corporate entity
for the purpose of transferring shares of stock to the taxpayer, and to reduce taxes
on said transfer. The plan was held not to be within the intent of the tax statute
since it had no business purpose and was used only to achieve a reduction in taxes.
This case is viewed as a precedent for the disregard of a transfer of assets with-
out a business purpose but solely to reduce tax liability; rather than being limited
to corporate reorganizations, It has been applied to the federal tax statutes
generally.
22 See note 18, ante.
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iums paid for the annuity. With one exception, in the case of United
States v. Bond,23 the courts have displayed a consistent trend toward dis-
allowance of these interest payments as tax deductions. 24 The case of
Knetsch is representative of this trend; aside from dates and amounts,
the facts of the other cases do not differ materially. In these cases, where
additional and continuing policy loans prevented the annuity policies
from representing any real value, the decision pertaining to each case has
reasoned in accord with the Revenue Ruling that they were sham trans-
actions and that no real indebtedness existed.
The issue of form versus substance as regards taxation has been be-
fore the court on a number of occasions involving numerous factual
situations. 25 A study of these decisions and the various comments made
23 United States v. Bond, 258 F. (2d) 577, (1958). The court found the bonds
to be legitimate annuity contracts, thereby establishing valid indebtedness.
24 Knetsch v. United States, see note 1, ante; see Emmons case, note 19, ante;
Weller v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 270 F. (2d) 294 (1959).
25 a) The Supreme Court stated in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court
Holding Co., 324 U. S. 331, 334 (1945), "The incidence of taxation depends upon
the substance of a transaction. The tax consequences which arise from gains from
a sale of property are not finally to be determined solely by the means employed
to transfer legal title. Rather, the transaction must be viewed as a whole, and
each step, from the commencement of negotiations to the consummation of the
sale, is relevant. . . . To permit the true nature of a transaction to be disguised
by mere formalisms, which exist solely to alter tax liabilities, would seriously
impair the effective administration of the tax policies of Congress." b) Judge
Learned Hand in Gilbert v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 248 F. (2d) 399,
411-412 (C. A. 2, 1957) commented, ". . . If, however, the taxpayer enters upon a
transaction that does not appreciably affect his beneficial interest except to reduce
his tax, the law will disregard it; for we cannot suppose that It was part of the
purpose of the act to provide an escape from the liabilities that it sought to
impose." c) In Higgins v. Smith, 308 U. S. 473 (1940), 60 S. Ct. 355, it was held
that, "The Government may not be required to acquiesce in the taxpayer's election
of that form for doing business which is most advantageous to him. The govern-
ment may look at actualities and upon determination that the form employed for
doing business or carrying out the challenged tax event is unreal or a sham may
sustain or disregard the effect of the fiction as best serves the purposes of the tax
statute. To hold otherwise would permit the schemes of taxpayers to supersede
legislation in the determination of the time and manner of taxation." d) In
Talbot Mills v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 326 U. S. 521 (1946), and
Mattbiessen v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 194 F. (2d) 659 -(1952), is
found the holding that the amounts paid by the taxpayer are not in substance pay-
ments for the use of borrowed money. As a matter of substance the taxpayer does
not borrow any money, hence there is no "debt" on which he pays "interest." An
instrument that is called a "note" will not be treated as an indebtedness where it
does not in fact represent an indebtedness. e) In Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue v. Transport Trading and Terminal Corp., 176 F. (2d) 570, 572 (1949), the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit emphasized that "in construing words of
a tax statute which describe commercial or industrial transactions we are to under-
stand them to refer to transactions entered upon for commercial or industrial pur-
poses and not to include transactions entered upon for no other motive but to
escape taxation." f) United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U. S. 361 (1953) :
For the purpose of the federal tax laws, the substance of transactions is to be
determined uniformly in relation to the meaning and lntendment of the federal
laws. g) Griffiths v. Helvering, 308 U. S. 355 (1939): Taxes cannot be escaped
by anticipating arrangements and contracts however skilfully devised . . . by
which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew.
h) See note 21, ante.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
by the courts gives an indication of the ultimate conclusion that is forth-
coming concerning the disallowance of these interest payments as tax
deductions.
26
The one opposing decision reached in a case of this nature is that of
United States v. Bond,27 where the deduction of interest paid in 1952 on
notes executed for the purchase of single premium annuity bonds was
upheld and the contention that there was no real indebtedness was rejected.
In the Bond case, however, which also occurred before section 264 of the
1954 Code abolished single premium loan plans, the policyholder did not
strip his policy of all value by additional loans, and it was possible to
realize a modest profit under the annuity plan without the tax deduction
(although the deduction feature was unquestionably the overriding motive
in inducing Bond to so invest). Whether this factor sufficiently distin-
guishes the Bond case from those in which the deduction was disallowed
is a matter for speculation ; it is more probable that the courts are in basic
disagreement. The basic significance of the question lies in the application
of the later annuity decisions to current loan plans. For example, the
"trend of disallowance" that is apparent in the Knetsch, Weller, and
Emmons cases has more recently been echoed in a number of cases which
have disallowed an interest deduction on loans made to purchase United
States Treasury notes.2"
With strong controversy over the minimum deposit plan continuing
within the insurance industry, and neither Congress or state regulatory
bodies apparently willing or able to resolve the issue, what, then, will
be the ultimate solution reached by the Supreme Court? Although the
interest deduction is the heart of the minimum deposit and other policy-
loan plans, they cannot be dismissed as sham transactions since their main
purpose is not to create an interest deduction but to provide high insurance
coverage at reduced costs. On the other hand, a sound argument can be
made, at least when continuing policy loans are used to finance premiums,
that there is no real indebtedness since no use of borrowed money is pro-
vided, and that payments designated as interest are, in substance, direct
payments for insurance protection and consequently should not be de-
ductible.
26 See note 1, ante.
27 See note 23, ante.
28 Such loans were made popular by the fact that nontaxable interest income
plus tax savings generally exceeded the interest payable. Goodstein v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, 267 F. (2d) 127 (1959) ; Sonnabend v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 267 F. (2d) 319 (1959).
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On the basis of the evidence presented, it is not likely that action by
the Supreme Court will result in the abolition of loan financed insurance;
the definition of "interest" for tax purposes will probably be clarified and
existing statutes interpreted in a manner that can be expected to curtail the
abuses of the interest-deduction factor in loan-financed annuity contracts.
W. D. WALLACE
INTERNAL REVENuE-DEDUCTIONS IN GENERAL-WHETHER INSURANCE
PROCEEDS RETAINED UNDER A SETTLEMENT OPTION MAY QUALIFY FOR THE
MARITAL DEDUCTION-An interesting attempt to define what constitutes a
terminable interest in relation to life insurance policy proceeds is to be
found in the recent case of Estate of Werbe v. United States.' In that
case certain policies of insurance on the life of the decedent provided that
the proceeds of the policies, payable on receipt of proof of death, were to
be retained by the insurance company which was then to make monthly
payments to the decedent's widow. The policy provisions further stated
that in the event the wife should not survive, or should die while the
above-mentioned settlement was operative, any amount due on the pro-
ceeds was to be equally divided between the insured's sons as secondary
beneficiaries. The widow was also given the right to make withdrawals in
whole or in part from the proceeds retained by the insurer, but only on
interest payment dates, the first of which would fall one month after the
death of the insured for certain of these policies and a year later for one
other, and then in amounts not smaller than a sum stipulated. Following
the decedent's death, and the filing of an estate tax return, the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue excluded the value of these five insurance
policies in determining for estate tax purposes the amount of the marital
deduction. An additional tax was paid and the taxpayer then sued for
a refund of an alleged overpayment. Both the district court and the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, agreeing with the Commissioner,
concluded that the widow had only a terminable rather than an absolute
interest in the proceeds of the insurance policies, because the proceeds
could pass to the sons for less than full consideration and also because she
did not have a power of appointment exercisable in all events, so recovery
of the additional tax paid was denied.
The marital deduction2 provision was inserted in the Internal Revenue
Act of 1948 to equalize tax advantages in the common law and community
property states and its purpose was to permit the surviving spouse to
1273 F. (2d) 201 (1959), affirming 178 F. Supp. 704 (1959).
2 nt. Rev. Code. See. 812(e).
